Katherine Palmer Gordon

BC’s treaty process has taken a quarter-century of effort, with only four final agreements to show for it. Originally published in the November 2016 edition of Focus Magazine. IN RATHER EXCORIATING TONES, Douglas White III (Kwulasultun) states, “The treaty process has become a ludicrous proposition for First Nations in British Columbia.” White worked for Snuneymuxw’ First Nation’s treaty team before negotiations stalled in 2001. Elected chief in 2009, in 2010 he was also elected to the First Nations Summit, the political body advocating for First Nations’ interests in the treaty process. In 2013, disillusioned by the continuing lack of progress at the Summit, he stepped down again. Three years later, White is unequivocal in his current view of the treaty process: “It’s dead in the water right now.” Doug White Only four treaties have been concluded since 1992, when the process began. Seven non-binding agreements-in-principle have been reached, but there is little indication they are anywhere close to finality. The remaining 49 negotiations are mired in the gulf between First Nations’ expectations for meaningful treaties and meagre government mandates that are failing to meet them. The parties have significant differences on substantial issues such as fisheries, governance, and fiscal relationships, and in the 24 years to date that the process has been underway, have failed to resolve them. Of particular concern is the refusal of governments to recognize constitutionally-protected Aboriginal rights and title. Kathryn Teneese, chief negotiator for the Ktunaxa Nation in southeast BC, says that flies in the face of agreed principles for negotiations set out in the 1991 “BC Claims Task Force Report,” a report approved by all three parties at the start of the process. “If you read the recommendations regarding what should be included in negotiations, they’re very clear about that,” says Teneese. “The Task Force rejected the blanket extinguishment of Aboriginal title recognized in the Constitution and stated plainly that First Nations negotiating treaties should not be required to abandon those fundamental constitutional rights.” Despite that, the federal and provincial governments have ever since refused to recognize Aboriginal title in treaty negotiations. Both Doug White and Teneese believe that may be the single biggest impediment to progress: “A treaty without recognition of title will never happen on my watch,” confirms Teneese. “Ktunaxa have never, ever given up our title nor implied that we would approve an agreement that would extinguish it.” Kathryn Teneese It’s a position shared by many, if not most, First Nations. There is no way to move forward, says White, until governments are prepared to back down. On June 7 of this year, the federal and provincial governments and the First Nations Summit released a report entitled the “Multilateral Engagement Process to Improve and Expedite Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia.” The report proposes seven actions to advance progress on modern treaty-making, including consideration of substantial changes to government mandates. Does this finally spell the change that First Nations are looking for? White doesn’t believe it for a moment: “It isn’t going to make the slightest bit of difference,” he says scathingly. He’s read the report: “There is nothing new here that we haven’t seen before and which hasn’t already failed. For goodness’ sake,” he exclaims, “talk about ‘expediting’ the treaty process was already old back in 2010 when I joined the Summit, with nothing to show for it. It’s foolish to pretend it was meaningful back then. Clearly, it still isn’t.” On its face, the new report does come across as a tired rehash of old ideas. Most of the proposals echo recommendations made in a 2002 report by the same parties’ similarly-entitled “Improving the Treaty Process,” which included improving mandating processes (e.g. enabling negotiators more leeway to accept proposals at their local negotiating tables); using incremental agreements to make faster progress; and addressing the rapidly-mounting debt faced by First Nations in negotiations (estimated at about $500 million, which means that some First Nations could owe more than their eventual capital transfer). The recommendations gained little traction and the report was shelved. Similar recommendations were made again in 2011 in yet another report on expediting the process commissioned by then-Minister of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Jim Duncan and undertaken by consultant Jim Lornie. Lornie called on governments to re-evaluate their mandates, including the way in which Aboriginal rights are recognized and expressed in treaties. Yet again, nothing happened. Why should anyone expect anything different this time around? Provincial Minister of Aboriginal Relations John Rustad responds: “Because things are different now. All of the parties are more engaged. I think we have a real opportunity here.” When Rustad is asked whether that means his government is willing to make substantial changes to treaty mandates, however, he passes the buck: “I understand the federal government is looking at these issues, and they do need to be addressed, but we aren’t ready to discuss that together yet.” When will they be ready? “We haven’t set a timeline to discuss it.” No federal government representatives were available for comment prior to deadline, despite several interview requests. But Cheryl Casimer, a current Summit representative, says she is confident the federal government is prepared to step up to the plate. “Ottawa proposed undertaking the report in the first place,” says Casimer, “and federal officials have been more than willing throughout to discuss all the issues.” Despite Rustad’s talk of engagement and “real opportunity,” Casimer isn’t anywhere near as sure about BC’s commitment. It’s a significant concern: “I think we need a strong champion at the provincial level, or this won’t work. To be honest, I don’t think we have one.” Certainly, Premier Christy Clark has not been a robust advocate of the treaty process. Instead, Clark’s government appears to prefer negotiating agreements outside the treaty process, such as forestry tenures and pipeline benefit agreements. “That’s all very well,” observes Casimer, “but these are short-term agreements and they’re not constitutionally protected. They aren’t treaties and they aren’t going to last. I’ve got this sense,” she adds, “that the provincial government is simply continuing an agenda of ‘look what we can do without treaties’ and there isn’t any real commitment to this.” Like Casimer, Kathryn Teneese has serious concerns about the provincial government: “My impression is that Canada is genuinely interested in looking at ways to address the issues substantially. They seem to be talking the real talk for the first time. I’m not getting that feeling or messaging from BC at all.” Teneese also thinks that the provincial government has a different agenda: “In recent times BC tends to want to find the ‘easy’ button instead of dealing with resolving the hard issues, like reconciliation of Aboriginal title. It’s fundamental to achieve that in a meaningful way to reach treaties, but every time you hear from Rustad and Clark, it’s all about these piddling little short-term resource agreements they have with First Nations. They aren’t reflective in the slightest of what we are trying to achieve in constitutionally-protected treaties.” After two decades of struggling to make progress, Teneese is angry. “I’ve met with Rustad and he goes on about how frustrated he is that after all these years there is no progress, and I think, how dare he say that? He has no idea, or maybe he’s just chosen not to listen to us about what it will take to move us forward. Mostly it seems to be about tweaking the status quo.” Despite all that, says Teneese, Ktunaxa are committed to staying the treaty course. Being in the process has helped Ktunaxa build stability and capacity, and establish predictability in its approach to various issues at the table. “We have an excellent track record now that shows we’re in a position to move into a different and better relationship with governments. We’re going to keep working towards that goal. Perhaps I’m naïve, but I truly hope the new report signals that the governments are willing to do the same and that there’s light at the end of the tunnel.” “It’s fundamental, however,” repeats Teneese firmly, “that our rights are recognized in order for us to reach a meaningful government-to-government relationship. We just have to look back at why we started the treaty process. We wanted to resolve the issues without extinguishing our Aboriginal title.” “That is still the imperative that keeps us here and which must be achieved,” she concludes. “I can’t accept the approach to co-existence with First Nations that has ruled the day for the last 150 years, denying the existence of our Aboriginal title and rights. It’s unfinished business. It can’t stay this way.” Katherine Palmer Gordon is a former BC Chief Treaty Negotiator. She is currently working on New Zealand’s final treaties with First Nations there.

Is the Supreme Court of Canada’s declaration of Aboriginal title the death knell for proposed resource projects in BC? First published in the September 2014 edition of Focus Magazine TRIBAL CHAIRMAN of the Tsilqhot’in National Government Chief Joe Alphonse, 46, was sitting in the Supreme Court of Canada on June 26 this year when it declared that the Tsilqhot’in Nation holds Aboriginal title to more than 1750 square kilometres of what is now former provincial Crown lands. “This decision will be remembered as a turning point in the history of Canada and its relationship with First Nations,” reflected Alphonse. Some corporate commentators were appalled—to the point of hysteria. Businessman Gwyn Morgan, writing in the Globe and Mail, described the recognition of Aboriginal title as “a recipe for investment-killing litigation” and that the decision amounts to “economic poison” for Canada, ushering in a new era of economically-devastating business uncertainty. Others responded more optimistically. The BC Business Council refused an interview, but shortly after the decision was announced, Vice-President of Communications Tom Syer blogged: “Do not panic. The sky is not falling. The decision will have significant implications [but the] desired path forward is through engagement, dialogue and respectful negotiation.” First Nations, of course, greeted the momentous decision with jubilation, and a strengthened resolve not to allow their hard-won rights and title to be trampled on any longer by government and industry. Several groups had previously launched lawsuits challenging Enbridge Inc’s Northern Gateway Pipeline and Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain proposal. Immediately after the decision, another nine First Nations followed suit. Two weeks later, on July 10, the Gitxsan First Nations served eviction notices on resource-based companies operating in their North Coast territory. “This is the end,” says Joe Alphonse emphatically, “of denying First Nations’ rights and title. It’s the start of a new way for everyone.” A changed economic landscape Is the resource-based economy of BC dead in the water? No, says Alphonse, it isn’t. He believes the Tsilqhot’in decision could in fact be very good for the provincial economy. But the economic landscape has changed permanently, and that can’t be ignored. Alphonse says that the case will, without question, help First Nations hold the wall against environmentally-devastating projects like pipelines and mines that threaten their lands and waters. In other words, companies like Enbridge, Kinder Morgan, Taseko Mining Group, and Imperial Metals just got a serious wake-up call. So did a provincial government that has been actively promoting LNG and mining mega-projects in BC. Says Alphonse, “People should understand that First Nations aren’t going to tolerate having these kinds of projects shoved down their throats any more. Some development proposals will always be unacceptable. They were unacceptable before the court case, they still are, and now the Tsilqhot’in title case has provided a legal club for First Nations to use to stop them.” Hence the flood of lawsuits against the Northern Gateway and Trans Mountain pipeline proposals that immediately followed the decision, along with the eviction notice served by the Neskonlith on Imperial Metals Inc after the Mount Polley dam breach. On the other hand, Alphonse says: “First Nations will support development that is beneficial to them, so long as it’s the right kind of development. So it should also be understood that Aboriginal title is simply a legal club we can now use to ensure we benefit from development when it’s on our lands, to ensure that we’re included in planning, in revenue-sharing, and in employment opportunities.” Alphonse also notes that it is up to governments and industries to put to rest any panic-stricken hype about economic uncertainty by dealing promptly, respectfully, and honourably with their First Nations counterparts. “It’s in their hands. The only thing that will perpetuate economic uncertainty now is if governments and industry simply say ‘it’s business as usual,’ and nothing changes.” Tsilqhot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 214 SCC 44 Alphonse was just 14 years old in 1982, the year Aboriginal rights were enshrined in section 35 of Canada’s new constitution. Barely a year later, the provincial government granted a logging licence to Carrier Lumber Ltd over the area claimed in the court case, but failed to take into account the Aboriginal rights of the Tsilqhot’in. Their objections fell on deaf ears. Faced with little other choice, they headed to court with their title claim. Both the provincial and federal governments opposed it, vigourously, for the next three decades. But on June 26 this year, they lost—resoundingly. Anyone who thinks this case isn’t an outstanding victory for the Tsilqhot’in—and First Nations all over the province—hasn’t read it. The 40-page unanimous decision is compelling, straightforward, and crystal-clear. For the first time ever, the Supreme Court declared the continued existence of Aboriginal title over a specific area of Crown land. It also put beyond debate that a First Nation holding proven Aboriginal title has the exclusive right to decide how the land is used and to benefit from it. If Aboriginal title is established and the consent of the First Nation hasn’t been obtained to a project on their lands, the project may have to be cancelled. That’s not without constraint. It’s a collective right, and the land must be managed for the benefit of future generations. As well, while governments have to respect title, they can infringe it to further a “compelling and substantive” governmental objective, such as the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, hydroelectric power, general economic development, the building of infrastructure, and protection of the environment. That may seem a catch-all that would allow government to pretty much do as it wishes. But the Court also set out exacting standards that must be met in justifying any incursion on Aboriginal title. The infringement must be necessary; it can’t prevent future generations from controlling and benefiting from the land; and the benefits of the objective must outweigh any other adverse effects on Aboriginal title. These considerations can’t be determined solely by government, as they have in the past. The First Nation’s views must be given equal weight. In other words, it’s no longer a one-way street in which government makes all the decisions. Governments can avoid having to justify a proposed infringement, the Court pointed out bluntly, by simply obtaining the consent of the First Nation holding title in the first place. While the provincial government can continue to regulate Aboriginal title lands, it has a very limited scope of authority. Regulating pest control would be fine, for example, said the Court; but issuing timber licences to a third party without justification or consultation, as it had done in this case, clearly would not. Title here, there and everywhere “Proving Aboriginal title is no longer a political pipedream,” observes Victoria-based lawyer Drew Mildon. “That’s huge for First Nations across the country. Their negotiating position on any project proposals became much, much stronger overnight.” Mildon, who was a legal adviser to the Tsilqhot’in on the court case, believes the case sets the stage for other First Nations across the province to bring their own successful title claims: “When you scratch the surface of British Columbia, there is existing title all over the province.” Merle Alexander, a Vancouver-based Aboriginal rights lawyer, agrees with Mildon. “We’re looking at this for a number of clients, many of whom have territory that would be crossed by various proposed pipelines. It seems very likely that many of them will be able to prove title along those pipeline corridors.” Alexander also says that while the list of potentially justifiable infringements seems broad, it is still a significant hurdle to jump for proponents because of the criteria imposed upon it by the Supreme Court. He is particularly taken with the Court’s suggestion that the Crown avoid the risks of unjustifiably infringing Aboriginal title or having to cancel unauthorized projects by simply obtaining consent from First Nations in the first place. “To date governments have taken a very narrow, self-interested approach to the issue. That’s demonstrated by their fairly consistent track record of losing court cases,” says Alexander. “This now encourages governments to be more forward-thinking and obtain consent as a starting point for all future projects on any lands where Aboriginal title is asserted. That’s also a safer bet from a strategic point of view: It minimizes the risk of litigation that the government probably won’t win, or that they’d have to cancel a project when the First Nation successfully sues for title.” Governments need to do a complete rethink In a radio interview shortly after the decision was announced, Union of BC Indian Chiefs President Stewart Phillip commented drily: “There’s been a deafening silence from Ottawa and Victoria. They weren’t expecting this.” “The federal government and British Columbia have gone very quiet,” agrees Joe Alphonse. “We’ve been contacted by some senior government staff, but I’m waiting to hear from the Prime Minister and the Premier. Stephen Harper and Christy Clark should be leading the way at this momentous time.” Unfortunately, they don’t seem to be. The only statement that’s been made by the federal government was a short press release on June 26 by Aboriginal Affairs Minister Bernard Valcourt saying that the government is reviewing the decision to determine next steps. MP Jean Crowder, the federal NDP critic on Aboriginal Affairs, thinks that’s unfortunate. Crowder sees the decision as an opportunity for governments to move forward by recognizing Aboriginal title and developing protocols for dealing with resource projects, so that everyone is clear on their roles and responsibilities. “That has the potential to provide the certainty anyone considering resource development is looking for. Up until now, it’s been managed on a court case by court case basis and that’s made it difficult for business to do any kind of planning.” If the decision is seen as an opportunity to manage the development process better, says Crowder, “that gives us a way of moving forward.” As for the provincial government, on July 21, BC Premier Christy Clark told a Pacific Northwest Economic Region LNG conference: “To me, the decision gives us a little more certainty and that’s going to be good for the economy. We’re still working through the details and how it might change the way we do things.” But the provincial government, added the Premier, has already been doing a good job on the Aboriginal relations file: “Since the Delgamuukw [Aboriginal rights] decision came out the government has learned how to deal fairly and honourably with First Nations and to change the way we do things, and that’s been really good for the economy.” BC NDP Aboriginal relations critic Scott Fraser thinks more is needed: “It’s time for the government to recognize that Aboriginal rights and title exist, and to acknowledge it respectfully and openly. That’s what will bring certainty to industry and to government. Continuing to force litigation will only lead to confrontation. It’s far better to get out of the court system to reconcile jurisdictional issues and that needs to be through recognition of title.” Merle Alexander agrees. He also points to the number of Aboriginal rights court cases that the provincial government has faced over the last decade and the fact that BC has a track record of losing them: “So the Courts are consistently finding in fact that BC is failing in its duties towards First Nations. That suggests that the Province hasn’t been dealing fairly and honourably with First Nations.” There could be positive implications for the economy, he says, but only if the government and industry are willing to embrace the new legal reality facing them. “If the Premier’s saying it’s just business as usual, that they’re doing everything right already, that’s not going to be good for the economy. That’s just going to mean more litigation.” Merv Child is a Victoria-based lawyer and executive director of Nanwakolas Council, which works with seven First Nations on northern Vancouver Island to support them in land use planning and decision-making. Like Alexander, Child is sceptical; he says that despite what the Premier says, the Clark government hasn’t been particularly open to positive solutions in dealing with Aboriginal issues. “We keep hearing that there’s no money to do anything, for example, but I think that the government needs to think longer-term about the positive financial consequences of working with First Nations.” He agrees with Alexander that the status quo isn’t good enough anymore: “There needs to be a complete re-think of the relationship. If that happens, then there is some real promise for the future.” Taseko in denial? Lawyer Robin Junger is head of the Aboriginal Law group at McMillan LLP, which acts for the Taseko Mining Group. Junger is typical of legal commentators advising resource-based industry; he is adamant that the Tsilqhot’in case is not a “game-changer” that will undermine resource projects, nor does it represent “a fundamental advance” for the law of Aboriginal title. Junger’s opinion may help explain Taseko’s position on the case. Taseko is attempting to develop its proposed New Prosperity gold-copper mine near Teztan Biny (Fish Lake), a sacred place in the heart of Tsilqhot’in territory. The proposed mine has been much-reviled by First Nations and environmental groups, and has failed federal environmental assessment twice. Taseko continues to push the proposal, however, and takes this rather surprising position on its website: “The ruling confirms that Taseko’s New Prosperity [mine] is located in an area where Aboriginal title does not exist.” Merle Alexander laughs when he reads the statement. Words like “deluded” and “deranged” pepper his response when asked if Taseko is correct in its interpretation of the case. Both Mildon and Alexander agree that the case can’t possibly be interpreted as meaning that title doesn’t exist elsewhere in the territory. Alexander points out: “The Tsilhqot’in intentionally and strategically chose to claim a targeted portion of the traditional territory. If challenged, it is highly likely the Tsilqhot’in would succeed in a title claim to the New Prosperity site. The proposal has also been rejected twice because of the potential effect on Aboriginal interests being too great to justify the project as being in the public interest. That’s not about to change.” Drew Mildon concurs: “It seems a surprising conclusion. The Tsilhqot’in only requested a declaration of title for the areas where it was proven. New Prosperity was rejected twice because of a host of significant adverse impacts, aside from the title issue, and it is ridiculous to suggest that the ruling in any way changes that.” Northern Gateway? Not likely Enbridge may be equally deluded in thinking its Northern Gateway project can still advance in the face of this decision. The company’s Communications Manager Ivan Giesbrecht emailed: “This important decision affirms existing principles surrounding First Nations title in Canada. Resolving these issues provides greater clarity to complex matters and creates opportunities for respectful relations. We have more work to do and are committed to building on progress in the months ahead.” However, Stewart Phillip’s view, typical of most First Nations affected by the proposed pipeline, suggests Giesbrecht is overly-optimistic: “The Northern Gateway Pipeline cannot proceed without the consent of every First Nation whose territory the pipeline would cross, and we know that will never happen.” No less than eight First nations have already taken legal action, and, according to West Coast Environmental Law, over 100 First Nations have banned the Enbridge project and other tar sands infrastructure from their territories and watersheds through various declarations. Merle Alexander points out that if Enbridge insists on attempting to push forward with the pipeline, it will be, almost without question, the next legal Aboriginal title confrontation that industry and governments face. “And they’re going to lose. It is absolutely impossible for them to achieve consent or prove that the pipeline wouldn’t irreconcilably interfere with the enjoyment by future generations of the land it crosses.” Jean Crowder agrees: “I think Enbridge won’t be able to overcome the challenges it is facing now.” Scott Fraser also shares that view: “Projects like Northern Gateway have been almost universally opposed by First Nations. Without First Nation consent, both governments should be saying ‘No’ as well.” That, adds Fraser, “is going to be true of every major infrastructure project in this province unless governments engage in a real partnership approach with First Nations.” The Province and LNG Despite the Supreme Court ruling, Taseko, as we know, continues to push for approval of the New Prosperity mine. There is also no sign that Enbridge or Kinder Morgan are backing off their pipeline projects. Given the glacial pace at which the federal government does anything—it took four years for it to review and update half-a-dozen of its treaty mandates, announced in late July—holding out any hope that it will act in the short-term seems fruitless. On the Province’s side, Aboriginal Relations Minister John Rustad will only say that his government needs time to review the ruling thoroughly. However, he adds: “We’re not going to tell First Nations what we’re doing. We’re going to sit down with them and work with them to decide what the response should look like.” He points out that in the last ten years the provincial government has successfully negotiated hundreds of shared decision-making agreements with First Nations on everything from treaty to revenue-sharing to conservation management: “I think the strengths we’ve developed in taking that shared decision-making approach will be very helpful in our discussions with First Nations on this issue.” As evidence of that, on August 6, the provincial government announced that it has agreed with the Taku River Tlingit First Nation to protect over one million hectares of Crown land around Atlin from hydro-electric development and commercial logging. Of course, the Taku River Tlingit have also been very successful in Court defending their Aboriginal rights. In other parts of the province, Rustad’s words are less encouraging. Asked if the government is prepared to cancel exploration permits provided to pipeline project proponents such as Enbridge, if and when title is proven along the pipeline corridor by other First Nations, Rustad remained non-committal: “We have statutory requirements and processes to follow and we need to follow them.” A successful Aboriginal title lawsuit will trump any such statutory requirements, naturally. Unfortunately, it sounds like that may be what is required. In the meantime, the provincial government has also not slowed down for a moment in promoting its LNG strategy. How will it respond to continued First Nations opposition to LNG proposals? Rustad professes to be “confused” by the question. “I haven’t heard any solid opposition to LNG,” he says. “There may be some local issues we will be working through—concerns about environmental impacts— but we’ve been having very positive discussions and I believe we will work through that.” Setting aside for a moment the fact that it doesn’t get more local than an LNG pipeline running through your back yard, or that having land declared as Aboriginal title land will likely focus such “local” issues as environmental concerns in an entirely new way, Rustad may be under a serious misapprehension that LNG faces no serious First Nations opposition. Chief Terry Teegee of the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council has stated repeatedly and unequivocally that the Province doesn’t have a social licence to promote LNG: “They haven’t addressed the cumulative effects of these pipelines in our territories.” Fort Nelson Chief Sharlene Gale has stated that the price her First Nation is being asked to pay to fulfill BC’s LNG strategy is too high. The Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs have unanimously rejected the Pacific Trails Partnership LNG proposal, and the Unist’ot’en Camp remains firmly in place in its path. “There is no sweeping endorsement of LNG by First Nations, and the reason is obvious,” Stewart Phillip told Focus earlier this year. “The impacts of fracking are one of the ugliest footprints of oil and gas to witness.” In the face of such stated distaste for LNG, and with Aboriginal title now in their back pockets, the likelihood of First Nations simply accepting new LNG proposals without demur seems highly unlikely, despite Rustad’s optimism. “The only route to go” There is a very simple formula for industry to follow if they want to keep working in Aboriginal territory, says Joe Alphonse: “Work with us, not against us.” At the wrong end of the working-together spectrum is the Taseko Mining Group. The company has failed spectacularly to handle matters with the Tsilqhot’in an effective manner: “I can’t say anything good about Taseko,” says Alphonse. “They keep trying to push that mine forward but they don’t want to include us or work with us. They just see us a hindrance. But I can guarantee that a title case there will be successful. There have been a lot of archaeological finds there. It’s a sacred place.” But Alphonse says Taseko stands in stark contrast to several companies that have worked closely and successfully with the Tsilqhot’in since well before the Supreme Court decision came down. All of them have been ahead of the game in seeing the value in working with the First Nation and ensuring the Tsilqhot’in share the revenues and benefits of their developments, to their mutual advantage. “It’s a win-win situation for both sides that way. Everyone gets what they need and want out of a project.” Working together will also be a good strategy for First Nations to take amongst themselves, believes Merv Child. Child speculates that the Tsilqhot’in decision may be a good impetus to encourage First Nations to resolve overlapping Aboriginal title claims to their mutual advantage: “The rights that go with Aboriginal title are very powerful,” he observes. “If First Nations can collaborate to demonstrate their respective occupation and use of various areas, that will allow them to leverage the Tsilqhot’in decision in discussions with industry and government to their greatest benefit.” But for now, the focus is on more immediate matters, and the game-changing decision itself. “We did the impossible,” says Joe Alphonse. “We won title when governments never thought we could. Now we hope that those governments will take it seriously and that will lead to a better future for all First Nations in this country.” Indeed, some would argue it will lead to a better and more environmentally-sound economic future for all Canadians. The onus, repeats Alphonse, is for federal and provincial government and industry leaders to start dealing with First Nations in terms of economic development in an honourable way. “That’s where certainty lies. That’s good for everyone,” he says. “It’s the only route to go.” Katherine Palmer Gordon is the author of six books of non-fiction, including several BC Bestsellers and a Haig-Brown prize-winner. Her most recent book is We Are Born with the Songs Inside Us: Lives and Stories of First Nations People in British Columbia (Harbour Publishing). She has 20 years experience working with First Nations on land claims and inter-governmental relations.

While fleets of log-laden ships depart our shores in growing numbers, scores of mills have closed resulting in massive job losses in BC. With so few mills left to send logs to, logging companies claim exports are the only way to stay in business. With the removal of the requirement that forest companies holding tenure on Crown forestland must mill that timber locally, there’s little or no impetus for them to invest in much-needed infrastructure that would provide an alternative to log exports. What will it take for BC to stop exporting so much home-grown opportunity to Asia? Originally published in the September 2012 edition of Focus Magazine “ADVOCATES OF RAW LOG EXPORTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA claim log exports create employment. The truth of the matter,” the United Steelworkers Union declared bluntly in a May 2012 publicity campaign linking massive BC job losses to record volumes of log exports, “is that raw-log exports kill BC jobs.” A few months earlier, the Truck Loggers’ Association had kicked a similar but opposing crusade to support log exports into high gear. “Many people continue to insist that exporting logs means we are exporting BC jobs,“ stated TLA Executive Director Dave Lewis in a February 2012 press release. “This is simply not the case. Log exports support jobs in the logging and transportation sectors. The last thing we should be doing,” insisted Lewis, “is sacrificing the jobs we already have by banning log exports.” It’s an acrimonious battle line between BC’s manufacturing sector and harvesting companies that goes back a long way. It’s not just an economic issue; it’s a highly emotional one in a province where trees and wood products have been the backbone of the economy for more than a century, and where protection of both our forests and our manufacturing jobs is dear to the heart of most British Columbians. Log exports were banned as far back as 1891, but have also always been a cash cow for those in the harvesting and transportation business; hence the introduction of exemptions less than 20 years later, in 1909. The war has raged back and forth ever since. When times are good in the manufacturing business here, the angst over exports naturally loses its intensity. When things are tough going, as they have been for the last few years, the fight hits the front pages on a regular basis. By the end of 2011, with record-breaking levels of log exports headlining the news, the battle had taken on a whole new level of intensity. In 2010, more logs were shipped to China alone from this province than in the preceding 20 years combined. By May 2011, the volume of log exports to that country had already exceeded 2010 totals. By the end of the year, they had exceeded those totals by a third again. In the meantime, manufactured wood product exports had dropped in value from $16.6 billion in 2000 to $7.6 billion in 2009. Over 50,000 timber-based jobs had vanished since 1991, a decline of 52 percent. For every job opening in the forestry sector in 2011, there were 34 unemployed workers lining up for it, and over the year, forestry employment dropped a further 2.3 percent from 2010 figures: another 1,660 people out of work in just twelve months. Were record export volumes responsible, or were they helping maintain what few jobs were left in the forestry sector? First, some background Bill Dumont is a registered professional forester and a consultant in forestry policy and economics based in Cobble Hill. In 2006, with export volumes on the rise and BC’s manufacturing sector in economic freefall, the provincial government commissioned Dumont and former deputy minister of forests Don Wright to undertake a review of log exports and their impact on the forestry industry. Those two analysts concluded that trying to correlate job losses with log exports simply doesn’t work. Increases in exports, they wrote, lead to increases in harvesting and export-related jobs but a decrease in processing positions. With constantly fluctuating numbers, added Dumont and Wright, “It isn’t possible to say anything definitive about the net effect.” Dan Schrier agrees with that assessment. Asked if it was possible to do an objective mathematical analysis of the data, Schrier, who is the manager of trade and business statistics for BC Statistics, said “no” immediately. “I suppose it would technically be possible,” he admitted after some thought, “but it would be enormously complicated. You’d have to make so many assumptions about so many variable aspects that it would be almost impossible to rely on the outcome.” But that doesn’t mean a link can be dismissed out-of-hand, especially when it comes to the coast. Here, for instance, are a few more facts and figures to toss into the mix, along with a little history to consider. According to BC Statistics, in 2011 log exports comprised only about ten percent of BC’s overall annual forestry revenues (pulp is the dominant export, followed by processed softwood products). For the coast, however, that ten percent figure is misleading. The term “log exports” can only mean coastal log exports. There is virtually no log export market for BC’s interior wood harvest, because of the high cost of transportation to export hubs. In that context, the figures look quite different: last year, while record numbers of unemployed forestry workers lined up to collect EI cheques, 31 percent of all trees harvested on BC’s coast were being exported in log form. The tension between would-be exporters and the manufacturing industry also intensified in early 2003. That’s when the Liberal government’s Forest Revitalization Act removed what was known as the “appurtenancy” requirement from provincial forestry tenures, a condition that had previously required tenure holders to use the trees in local sawmills. It was a huge blow to an industry that had already seen 15 medium to large sawmills close on the coast since 1990 (and another 18 in the interior). By 2003, there were 28 active sawmills in that category left on the coast, processing 2.3 billion board feet per year. By 2006, another five sawmills had closed. Three years later, only 19 medium to large coastal mills remained, processing 1.2 billion board feet annually. The estimated figures for 2011 are much the same. In the meantime, coastal log export volumes spiked immediately after the removal of the appurtenancy clause, increasing by 20 percent over 2002 volumes. There was a sharp drop in 2004, but that seems to have been an anomaly: the rate doubled again in 2005 and stayed at that level through 2006. It dropped again in 2007 following the burst of the US housing bubble, nonetheless remaining at higher levels than 2003. Since then, the volume has kept steadily climbing, while employment rates, as we already know, continue to decline. How log exports work...in theory A permit from the provincial government is required for the export of any trees harvested from provincial Crown lands. There are limits on how many logs harvested from provincial Crown lands can be exported, as well as on which species, and before a permit can be issued, the log must be harvested, graded, and ready for shipment. It must also first be offered for sale to BC buyers, to determine whether it is surplus to the needs of the domestic manufacturing sector. Any offer to purchase the log is reviewed by the Timber Export Advisory Committee, or TEAC, a panel of individuals from various sectors of the industry. TEAC’s job is to determine whether the offer is fair, based on the current price being paid for logs on the domestic market. An export permit will only be issued if no offers are received or TEAC rejects the offer as unfair, and declares the log surplus. Successful applicants for an export permit must pay the provincial government a fee in lieu of manufacture on the log’s domestic market value, depending on the species and where it is harvested. A Douglas fir harvested on Vancouver Island attracts a 20 percent fee, for example; for all species on the north coast, the fee is just five percent. Export limits are also set higher on the north coast, where, since the mid-1980s, it’s been permissible at times to export 100 percent of the harvest from some areas. In other words, government has essentially waived the fees and normal volume limits in locations where, thanks to the loss of local mill capacity, it’s too expensive for the harvesting companies to ship logs profitably to the few domestic mills that remain. If the log is leaving Canada, a federal export permit must also be obtained. The federal government also regulates all exports out of BC from private and federal lands. The surplus test is essentially the same, but no fee in lieu of manufacture is charged and there are no constraints on which species may be exported, although limits are placed on the total volume that can be applied for in any one permit. …and how they work in practice The fee in lieu of manufacture has proved to be little disincentive for harvesting companies that can earn close to double the domestic price in export premiums. For 2007, the last year for which specific figures are available, the province earned a paltry $1.3 million in fees from coastal exports. But revenues to the industry that year were $369 million. By 2011, revenues were $588 million. It’s unsurprising that in February 2012, Minister of Forests Steve Thompson admitted the provincial government was receiving an average of 1000 export permit applications every month. And there is no fee charged on logs exported from private and federal government lands. Given that 65 percent of exported logs came from private forest lands in 2011—even though they comprise only about five percent of BC’s forested lands—it’s a lost revenue opportunity and a regulatory issue that is begging to be addressed. The surplus test is also under fire. Cowichan Valley MLA Bill Routley, NDP critic on the forestry file, says something’s gone fundamentally wrong when BC mills are “crying out for wood” while record volumes of logs are being shipped offshore. In March, Teal Jones Group CFO Hanif Karmally told the media that the company could put another 100 to 115 people to work at its Surrey sawmill if it could get more logs. Routley says this is just one example of many he has heard: “Around two dozen offers are made by BC buyers every month to buy logs for which export permit applications have been made, but only three or four succeed. The rest are being categorized as surplus, despite the purchase offer, and exported regardless.” The same month, news also broke that Minister of Forests Steve Thomson had overruled a TEAC decision that logs should be sold to Teal-Jones, handing the exporter a permit instead. On further investigation, it was revealed that a total of 86 TEAC decisions originally made in favour of local purchasers had been overturned. TEAC had started making its decisions based on excluding the costs of shipping the logs to the buyer, a policy change that favours the competitiveness of domestic buyers over would-be exporters. When he learned of it, Thomson brought the new practice to a rapid end. By February, the government had ceased referring any applications to TEAC from the west coast of Vancouver Island, saying it expected the decisions would be overturned anyway. The industry’s argument “The global industry is ultra-price sensitive and ultra-competitive,” says Rick Jeffery, president and CEO of the Coast Forest Products Association, who also describes forestry markets as “brutal.” Jeffery insists: “It’s very simplistic to say that the export of logs is the export of jobs and that it’s easier to export logs than to sell them here, so that’s why companies do it, but neither of those things are true.” He says that BC’s log exports are simply a response to market demand. “Log exports have always been part of the mix in BC. On any given day companies look at the costs and the margin return they can get on a particular log, and that’s what determines whether it goes to a mill or to the docks. Not every log has a market in BC that the company can make a profitable return from. If that’s the case, it isn’t going to sell the log here. It might not even cut it.” Some forestry companies say that a ban on log exports would simply cause more mill closures and job losses, because it isn’t worthwhile to cut logs for the domestic market unless they can also cut higher value export logs at the same time—it can cost up to $78 to harvest a log that only sells for $50 in BC but up to $90 offshore. Without the export premium, they can’t afford to take what they claim is almost always a loss on domestic sales. Dumont thinks that’s an indisputable fact: “I have absolutely no doubt there would be no logging going on without log exports.” On the north coast, where the nearest mills are simply too far away to transport logs economically to them, companies like Coast Tsimshian Resources Ltd claim that they are utterly dependent on being able to export their harvest. In July, CEO Wayne Drury told the Vancouver Sun: “If we and others in the northwest couldn’t do it, none of us [up here] would be in business.” Bill Sauer of the Northwest Loggers Association added: “If log exports were banned today, we might as well close the doors and throw away the keys.” Coastland Wood Industries Ltd President Hans de Visser confronts the tough realities of the business from the other side of the table. He says his Nanaimo-based veneer manufacturing plant has gone through some very difficult times recently: “Especially with China on fire—we had great difficulty finding logs of a suitable quality because all the best logs were going offshore. It’s been a bloodbath for us for the last couple of years.” As a manufacturer, de Visser could be forgiven for having harsh views on the subject of log exports. But he says a reality check is required: “When times are tough, everyone starts running around looking for someone to blame and pointing fingers. But in North America, we only have about half the normal home construction going on. The long-term average is 1.5 million housing starts a year. We’re still only at 700,000 or so.” When there’s no building going on, says de Visser, no one wants wood products. “That’s just the way it is. So the companies start exporting logs to China instead. At least the companies are logging,” he adds. “I think things would look a lot worse for the coast,” he admits frankly, “if we didn’t have any log exports at all.” Taking the easy way out But is that really true, or is it just the easiest default option? It sounds reasonable: it’s certainly true that right now, exporting companies are keeping thousands of forestry workers employed. But it also begs this question: if there were more domestic manufacturing mills buying logs, wouldn’t that make it economical to harvest for the local market? You bet, says Ben Parfitt, a forestry analyst for the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. “It strikes me that the more investment we get in manufacturing mills here in BC,” says Parfitt, “the more domestic demand there will be, and with increasing demand come higher prices. That’s to everyone’s advantage to see that happen, and soon. The longer we go without investment here, the more exports there will be. That’s what we really can’t afford.” In 2011, Parfitt undertook a detailed analysis of ways to boost manufacturing jobs in BC, picking up on a question that had been posed by UBC business management professor Rob Kozak: “Why is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of Douglas fir window frames, with about 1,500 employees, located in Manitoba?” BC, says Parfitt, continues to seek out new markets for its pulp, logs and low-end commodity products like rough-cut lumber. Parfitt says the better strategy would be to focus instead on diversifying BC’s product base into a much broader range of high quality secondary wood products—everything from specialized laminated materials to cabinets and mouldings—that are also in big demand in global markets, and which fetch considerably higher prices. Parfitt analyzed industry data and concluded that investment in the kind of infrastructure required for that level of production—along with ramped-up bio-energy production from wood waste, greater integration of infrastructure for improved efficiency, and reforestation management improvements to see older, higher- quality wood being harvested—would create as many as 2,630 additional manufacturing jobs and another 2,400 jobs in waste-wood recovery in the short term, an additional 5,200 seasonal silviculture jobs, and more than 10,000 jobs over the long term in higher-end value-added product manufacturing. An untaken opportunity These are compelling figures. But the big BC players have yet to invest a dime in new infrastructure of the kind Parfitt describes. “No-one has spent a cent on large mills in BC for 20 years,” agrees Dumont. That has also left the coast with virtually no mills capable of processing much of the second-growth wood that is now being exported. In a July editorial in the Vancouver Sun, Ancient Forest Alliance Executive Director Ken Wu quoted forestry analyst Peter Pearce, who in 2001 said that at as many as 14 new large mills would need to be built in BC over the next decade to cope with the changing pattern from old-growth to second-growth harvesting. Eleven years later, however, Teal-Jones’ Surrey mill is the only operation on the coast with that specific capability. Western Forest Products has done some upgrade work to two of its Vancouver Island sawmills, and says it plans to put another $200 million into further improvements to all of its mills and manufacturing plants over the next three years. But it is the exception. Instead, for the most part, says Parfitt, the industry—including Western Forest Products—has simply defaulted to the easy cash represented by log exports. “That represents a huge lost opportunity for a much greater return on our wood supply, and nothing’s being done to take it.” Wu says we need to learn from history. As with our fisheries, if we simply keep logging at the rate we are now, we can expect one day to see all of our old-growth forests vanish. “That’s why we need to retool the mills to be able to process high quality second-growth and develop high-end value-added manufacturing capability,” says Wu. “You don’t have to cut as much, but at the same time, you create more jobs in manufacturing. That, and protecting our remaining old growth forests, are the most important things to do right now.” But short-term profit goals are also trumping long term management planning to increase the inventory of older, higher-quality wood. Bowing to corporate pressure, the provincial government announced earlier this year that it is considering opening up protected areas of old-growth forests for logging activity. As Ken Wu succinctly puts it: “That’s like burning up parts of your house for firewood after you’ve used up all your other wood sources.” In the meantime, smaller and smaller trees are being taken off private lands and increasingly, from provincial Crown lands. With no mills capable of processing them, they are heading straight offshore. Opening up old-growth protected areas to logging is also completely counterintuitive to this statistic: nature-based commercial tourism that relies on forests provides an estimated 19,400 jobs in BC. That’s more than 40 percent of the total number of forestry jobs in the province in 2011. But if the government is aware of the threat it is posing to those jobs through this short-sighted strategy, there’s little sign of it. Can anything be done about all this? Export critics like Parfitt believe that more export disincentives are required and that a higher fee in lieu of manufacture, applied to both provincial Crown lands and federally-regulated private lands, would help rejuvenate local mill activity and provide government with much-needed revenue for investment. Rick Jeffery, on the other hand, believes the solution is to remove regulatory constraints, not add to them: “We’re over-regulated in BC, and we need to have a free market and competitive pricing to create a really healthy sector.” That, of course, won’t necessarily result in new mills, and Jeffery does agree there is an urgent need for infrastructure investment. With sufficient investment, acknowledges Jeffery, there are “huge” opportunities for BC mills to process and develop wood products that will justify paying domestic prices for logs that are competitive with export prices. “That’s the way the wind is blowing,” concurs veneer manufacturer Hans de Visser. “It just makes sense. I’m always bellyaching about having to compete against international buyers able to afford higher prices, but the reality is that sooner or later we are all going to have to compete with global prices. That’s the trend, whether we like it or not, so we’re just going to have to figure out how to do that.” De Visser thinks the government has to step up to the plate on the policy side. “They need to encourage the domestic manufacturing industry to spend the money, whether that’s through favourable taxes or subsidies—most other countries around the world do it, and BC would be remiss to turn a blind eye to that. That may smack of protectionism, but that’s just the reality.” Ben Parfitt says that the government is completely failing to provide regulatory drivers to ensure a viable domestic manufacturing industry across the board, especially with respect to logs taken from provincial Crown lands. “These are public resources and we should be able to dictate the terms on which they are used,” he argues. Parfitt advocates bringing log exports to an end through an escalating tax system that acts as a significant disincentive, and says government policies to encourage more manufacturing are essential: “We should insist on a minimum threshold of investment in local manufacturing, and if that isn’t met, then reallocate the resources to someone who will invest.” Last but not least, says Bill Dumont, on top of investments in the manufacturing sector, a gap he agrees needs to be addressed, there’s also a need for investment at ground level. “There’s a complete lack of government and industry interest in investing in the forest before the trees are cut,” says Dumont. “There are a lot of things we can do to manage better for value at the forest level as well as the manufacturing level, to increase prices and margins—fertilizing, pruning, thinning, genetic improvements.” Dumont says one of the issues facing workers in the manufacturing sector is increasingly sophisticated mechanization of production, reducing the need for labour. But the ground-level investment activities he is describing were all high employment activities in BC 30 years ago, and could be again. “Government hasn’t supported forestry work in the field since the 1970s, so we stopped. That was very short-sighted.” What is government doing? What little government has been doing has been counterproductive, says Dumont. “Governments have successively monkeyed with export policy over time, opening up markets when times are tough and when the going gets better again, closing them down. As things stand, no one is going to build new mills on the coast without certainty about where government policy is going to land on this issue.” Both the federal and the provincial government fund product development research, and in July $2.3 million was allotted to the Wood First! Program to promote use of BC value-added wood products. But that’s a drop in the bucket of the estimated $200 million plus required as just a starting point for essential infrastructure upgrades in BC. While the government’s Forest Sector Strategy speaks of “encouraging” investment, there appears to be no hard cash attached to that. In the meantime, as Dumont has pointed out, the government remains all over the map in its stance on log exports. It has publicly stated its preference that “all logs remain in BC to be manufactured into other products.” In an interview for this story, Minister Thomson repeated that is his ideal goal. But Thomson also admitted: “We recognize log exports are a critical component of the industry on Vancouver Island. There will always be log exports on the coast.” Thomson initiated a log export policy review in 2011. The report was expected this spring, but as of August, there was no committed date set for its release other than a vague “sometime this fall.” The behind-the-scenes scuttlebutt is that the draft report contains some nasty thorns that may need pruning out. Thomson would only say that “no decisions have yet been made on adjustments to the policy. The analysis of the impacts of potential adjustments is still a work in progress.” Whether the review will do anything to change the status quo in any significant way seems unlikely. NDP forestry critic Bill Routley is adamant some change is required. “I’m not talking about banning log exports,” he says. “There have always been exports. I’m talking about how we maximize the value-added opportunities here in BC first. The surplus test clearly isn’t working and the fee in lieu isn’t a sufficient disincentive because exports are growing.” Routley wants forest policy adjusted so that all sectors of the industry can benefit, but is light on specifics as to how that’s to be achieved, including the issue of stimulating investment in new infrastructure. “I do know we need to have the right policy tools, with incentives built in and strings attached to them, like requiring investment. I believe in a carrot-and- stick approach. We will increase the fee in lieu of manufacturing, but we have to get it right. We want to add jobs, not take them away.” Where does that leave things? With polls suggesting an NDP government will likely to be running the forestry file after May next year, it’s probable that Routley’s carrot-and-stick approach to log exports will win the day. That may not be soon enough to save the last remaining protected old-growth forest in the province, says Ken Wu: “It remains to be seen whether the BC Liberals want to leave behind a legacy as the despoilers of BC or not in the last few months of their term.” Wu is also worried about whether the NDP is really prepared to step up to the plate. “Is the war in the woods simply going to carry on under their tenure?” Unless a new government is prepared to put its money where its mouth is on infrastructure investment, it may simply find itself, like its predecessors, stuck in what is now a decades-old tug-of-war between the manufacturing sector and harvesting companies as they all struggle to stay afloat. One thing’s clear: it would be a rare individual who wouldn’t be in favour of seeing all of BC’s logs being used in a thriving manufacturing industry in BC. But unless and until something changes at a more fundamental level than policy tweaks and tax adjustments, we should expect to see newspaper headlines about job losses in the forestry sector and log-laden ships leaving our shores for some time to come. Katherine Palmer Gordon is an author and freelance writer based on Gabriola Island. She’s written five books with a sixth to be published by Harbour exploring the connections between culture and self through the stories of young aboriginal Canadians. Her history of land surveying in BC, Made to Measure, won the Haig-Brown prize at the 2007 BC Book Awards.

Wildlife advocates say that unless urgent action is taken to protect their winter dens from the impacts of industrial logging, black bears may disappear from Vancouver Island within a generation. November 29, 2020 A black bear pulls organic material into its den tree to create a soft floor (video still by Artemis Wildlife Consultants) DALLAS SMITH is President of Nanwakolas Council, a coalition of five First Nations on Northern Vancouver Island. Smith can’t understand why black bear dens are protected in the Great Bear Rainforest and on Haida Gwaii, but not on Vancouver Island. “It’s a huge question for the Nanwakolas Chiefs,” says Smith. “Just over the water—literally only a couple of kilometres away—black bear dens enjoy world class protection. Why not here?” Biologist Helen Davis, who has spent much of her career researching black bears, is equally bewildered. Despite the fact that privately-owned forest land and forestry tenures on Crown lands cover well over two-thirds of Vancouver Island, and the significant risks logging activity poses to bear habitat, the provincial government is doing nothing to protect dens on the Island. “There is no good explanation for it, says Davis. “None.” What’s the problem? A winter den may be used by multiple generations of black bears before the tree or stump disintegrates, but at that point, the bears must find other large trees or stumps to create new dens. The inventory of old-growth forest is rapidly shrinking, however, and second-growth trees are now typically harvested before they get large enough to accommodate new dens. Logging technology has become more sophisticated as well. Many tree stumps used to be big enough for dens, but now even the largest trees can be cut to ground level. Helicopter logging and aerial survey technology have also replaced “boots on the ground” in many areas, says Davis, diminishing the ability to spot den trees before they are logged. No dens mean no bear cubs. It also means that homeless black bears are straying into the Island’s urban areas, where they are at high risk of being shot. Last January, it was revealed that BC conservation officers had killed 4,341 “nuisance” bears province-wide in just the previous 8 years. Add the impacts of climate change on forest health and declining salmon runs into the equation, and while black bears may not currently be considered a species at risk, it seems likely that will soon change. Jake Smith fears that it will change much faster than we think. Smith is a Mamalilikulla First Nation hereditary chief and manager of the Nation’s environmental Guardian program. He and his fellow Guardians from other First Nations are constantly out on the ground in their territories, monitoring wildlife. Smith says they have been encountering fewer and fewer bears in the last decade. “At this rate,” says Smith sombrely, “we may see the last black bear on Vancouver Island within a generation.” Chief Jake Smith (right) with a tranquillized grizzly bear Taking it to the Forest Practices Board Davis has worked extensively with forestry companies on voluntary den protection guidelines, restored damaged dens, and created artificial ones where there aren’t enough large trees for bears to make new dens naturally. But she says these measures, while helpful, fall well short of what is required to ensure the continued survival of black bears on Vancouver Island. Nothing short of full legal protection of both dens and large trees is required, and urgently. In April 2019, Davis complained about the issue to the Forest Practices Board, which monitors and reports on compliance with the Forest & Range Practices Act (FRPA) on Crown lands. The Board responded in January 2020, acknowledging the lack of any governmental effort to afford black bear dens protection on Vancouver Island. While options exist in the FRPA to designate forested areas as having “regionally important wildlife status,” these have never been used for bears. Biologist Helen Davis beside a black bear den that was created from a stump and a piece of plywood. The Board also noted that the Ministry of Forests, Lands, Natural Resource Operations and Rural Development (FLNRORD) couldn’t say whether current forestry management is effective or not to adequately protect bear dens, or even accurately estimate the current bear population on the Island. The Board has no enforcement powers, however, and refrained from calling for formal den protection. Instead it simply urged the provincial government to “work with First Nations and stakeholders” on den “management.” It was unequivocal in its final conclusion, however: “If second-growth forests are harvested before they develop old-growth features, and old-growth harvest continues, the supply of suitable denning habitat on Vancouver Island will decline.” The provincial government’s stance A few days before BC Premier John Horgan called a snap election on September 21, the provincial government released an independent report on BC’s old-growth forest management. The report, A New Future For Old Forests, noted that the retention of “forests of old trees” is key for maintaining biological diversity, and concluded bluntly: “The overall system of forest management has not supported the effective achievement of legislated objectives for old-growth forests.” The report recommended prioritizing conservation of BC’s forest biodiversity and, at least until a new strategy is implemented, deferring development in old forests where ecosystems are at “very high and near-term risk” of irreversible biodiversity loss. In its wake, FLNRORD Minister Doug Donaldson agreed to defer any logging on up to 353,000 hectares until August 2022, but the areas being deferred contain little old-growth forest. Shortly before the election on October 24, the provincial NDP party began proclaiming it would protect all old-growth forest, but didn’t provide any details. Pleading election restrictions on provincial government media communications, no one would be interviewed or disclose any more information (as of late November). Green Party MLA Adam Olsen, an advocate for bear den protection, is sceptical that much will change: “My experience of working with the BC NDP on forestry is they have to be dragged kicking and screaming to do anything. Their approach is basically 1950s redux. It’s all about the economic opportunities in logging, and decisions about wildlife are made by the forestry ministry. Everything has been set up to fail these animals.” The forestry sector’s stance Government agency BC Timber Sales (BCTS) manages 20 percent of the provincial allowable annual cut. BCTS encourages protecting dens on Crown lands, but also emphasizes that BCTS must “be mindful of the licensee’s harvesting rights and their autonomy to direct their own operations.” In other words, logging rights trump den protection. The two biggest forestry companies operating on Vancouver Island (in terms of geographic spread) are Mosaic Forest Management Ltd, which handles approximately 6,000 square kilometres of private forest lands and forestry tenures on behalf of Island Timberlands and TimberWest, and Western Forest Products Ltd (WFP). Mosaic declined the opportunity to be interviewed, instead emailing a statement from its director of sustainability, biologist Molly Hudson, saying that Mosaic’s forestry decisions are guided by its “Bear Den Policy.” The policy, which Mosaic refused to disclose, requires protection of dens “wherever possible.” When asked for examples of when it has not been possible, Mosaic did not respond. WFP was also not available for an interview. Communications director Babita Khunkhun emailed to say that WFP “actively conserves habitat, including black bear dens, as part of our ongoing commitment to our role as stewards of forestlands.” In addition, wrote Khunkhun, WFP has “rigorous measures in place to identify and retain bear dens on the lands under our care, full-time biologists on staff, and uses independent consultants to design operating plans with the aim of conserving wildlife. Our measures include training field staff and contractors to identify and conserve bear dens and minimize disturbances to hibernating bears. We leave a reserve around dens and between October 21 and April 30, we adapt our road building and harvesting operations in proximity of dens.” Of course, WFP isn’t simply being a good environmental citizen; it’s required to meet provincial objectives for wildlife and biodiversity under BC’s Forest Planning Practices Regulation, including the objective to retain wildlife trees. Those objectives are however subject to the qualification that meeting them will not “unduly reduce the supply of timber from British Columbia’s forests.” WFP’s Vancouver Island forest stewardship plans, a requirement of the FRPA, specify only the minimum areas required to be set aside as wildlife tree retention areas in its cut blocks. The plans contain no specific reference to black bears. The Teal-Jones Group, which operates on southern Vancouver Island, is currently the subject of a blockade of intended old-growth logging at Fairy Creek near Port Renfrew. Teal-Jones also declined to be interviewed or provide any information about its guidelines—if it has any—for den protection. What happens on private forest lands? The FRPA does not apply to private forest land, even if classified as “managed” forest land under the managed forest program, where owners voluntarily commit to managing their properties to meet legislated environmental objectives. According to the Managed Forest Council (MFC), Southern Vancouver Island is home to the largest area of private forest land in the province. The MFC regulates the roughly 18 percent of private forest land that is in the managed forest program (about 800,000 hectares), but was unable to say how much of that is on Vancouver Island. The MFC’s Field Practices Guidelines contain an objective for critical wildlife habitat protection on “agreed terms” with the government, but do not mention bears. On its website, the Private Forest Landowners Association states that its members: “Recognize, and through agreement with the provincial government, protect critical wildlife habitat where it cannot be protected on Crown lands alone.” The PFLA was contacted for more information, but did not respond. An unacceptable state of affairs Helen Davis says: “Some of the forestry companies are doing better in the last three years, but it’s hard for me to celebrate when we’ve known about the problem for more than 25 years and it’s taken them this long to act.” Davis also points out that even when a den is protected by a logging outfit, it isn’t necessarily done the right way. She has seen lone trees standing on ridge lines, prone to being blown over in a strong wind, and at the sides of busy roads with nothing screening them from traffic. “Bears will probably abandon those dens, because they no longer afford adequate protection.” A black bear den tree in the middle of a cut block Jake Smith is scathing about the lack of meaningful engagement by both forestry companies and government. “I bring deep knowledge into my role as a Guardian,” Smith says. “I have been on these lands all my life. First Nations understand we need to protect bear habitat now, but everything we say to provincial officials falls on deaf ears.” As to promises to protect old-growth trees, Smith isn’t holding his breath. “Everything is dollar-driven. If the government and forestry companies were really interested in protecting bear habitat or big trees, they would already be working with First Nations to do it.” Indeed, A New Future For Old Forests recommends full engagement of Indigenous leaders and organizations on the development and implementation of policy and strategy to conserve large trees and biodiversity. Dallas Smith, President of Nanwakolas Council, agrees with that: “What’s urgently needed is a collaborative approach between First Nations, forestry companies and government that puts large trees and wildlife first, before dollar signs. It’s frustrating,” he continues. “There’s no leadership by government to take this on, and to bring the forestry industry along with them. Forestry companies tell us they want to partner with us, but they don’t want to do things differently. They want everyone to guarantee their economic future but won’t accept they have to do their part to protect the bears’ future.” First Nations are no longer going to accept the status quo, adds Smith. “Those days are over.” Guardians like Jake Smith are out on the land, identifying den trees, both existing and potential, and ensuring the logging companies know about them. Dallas Smith points out that all tenure applications also have to go past the First Nations for review: “They are taking a long, hard look at each one. If it doesn’t meet their standards for protection, they aren’t going to give it a green light.” Dallas Smith, President of Nanwakolas Council What good looks like Jeff Mosher manages Taan Forestry, owned by Xaaydaa GwaayGalang (the Haida Nation). Mosher says black bears play a critical role in Haida Gwaii’s ecosystem: “They’re a top predator in the food chain, for example. Sitka black-tailed deer have been a huge problem here, but the bears are helping keep the population down.” Bears are ecologically important in other ways: “They leave salmon carcasses and salmon-rich bear scat in the forest, containing important nutrients for the trees’ growth.” Black bears are culturally significant to the Haida (Taan is a Xaayda word meaning “black bear”) and the company therefore goes “well beyond” minimum protection requirements, says Mosher. “We’re lucky on Haida Gwaii because, thanks to the efforts of the Haida Nation, we have plenty of old-growth trees left that we can set aside. We’re planning for where new dens could go, planting cedar and allowing other trees to reach a sufficient size to be suitable for new dens.” Taan also proactively rehabilitates old dens, and field staff undertake physical ground searches for large trees and bear dens when flagging their cut blocks. Any den found is given a 60-metre reserve (the minimum requirement is 20 metres) in which no logging-related activity is allowed to take place. In prime denning season—November 15 to May 15—the restricted area is increased to 200 metres. These measures aren’t necessarily typical, says Mosher. “Other forestry companies have left Haida Gwaii because it wasn’t worth it to stay. But Taan’s shareholder is the Haida Nation. Protecting bears is a priority, even if it means a lower dividend.” Taan is a good model, says Davis, who is in the process of drafting “ideal guidelines” that forestry companies should be required to follow, including requirements to physically survey cut blocks for bear dens. FLNRORD should be mandating not only protection of the inventory of existing bear dens, she says, but planning to provide sufficient habitat in the form of large trees to meet future needs. The recommendations in A New Future For Old Forests should be implemented in full, as soon as possible. The Wildlife Act could be used to protect dens on all forested lands, public or private. A review of the effectiveness of the objectives of private managed forest lands, including protection of key public environmental values, has been underway by FLNRORD for nearly two years. Public feedback summarized on FLNRORD’s website strongly calls for more robust environmental regulation. Given the extent of private forest lands on Vancouver Island, exempting them from regulation would hugely devalue any measures applied on Crown lands only. Why it matters Black bear wildlife viewing brings substantial tourism revenue into provincial coffers, says Davis, as do hunting licences. Their role in maintaining biodiversity is critical. Not least of all, as Jake Smith points out, the cultural and spiritual interconnection between black bears, the forest ecosystem and First Nations is not only special, it’s fundamental: “That’s why it’s my job to help protect these animals. It’s so important.” If British Columbians and tourists want to continue to enjoy the visceral thrill of seeing the wild black bears of Vancouver Island, and if we want the bears to continue playing their part in the Island’s ecosystem, then something needs to be done, and fast. Otherwise Jake Smith’s grave prediction that we may see the last black bear on Vancouver Island within a generation is all too likely to come true. “We can’t let that happen,” says Smith. “We won’t.” Katherine Palmer Gordon is an award-winning non-fiction author and a contributor to numerous anthologies and magazines. She is currently working on her eighth book, showcasing Indigenous leadership in environmental stewardship and community wellbeing in the Great Bear Rainforest and Haida Gwaii. Learn more:

The BC treaty process turns 20 this month. Will it make it to 21? Originally published in the September 2012 edition of Focus Magazine SOMETIMES IT SEEMS THAT FOR EVERY STEP FORWARD in the BC treaty process, we take two steps back,” says Chief Treaty Commissioner Sophie Pierre, the frustration loud and clear in her voice. At its inception 20 years ago, there was optimism that the treaty process would be complete by now. It’s not even remotely close. Only two treaties have been completed, the Tsawwassen and Maa-nulth agreements. Three other final agreements have been signed, but that’s not as good as it sounds. The Lheidli T’enneh rejected theirs in 2007. A second vote is planned, but the outcome is uncertain. The Yale’s 2010 final agreement is on hold pending resolution of objections from their Sto:lo neighbours, who have overlapping claims to the Yale First Nation’s traditional territory and believe the Yale’s agreement infringes upon their rights. The Tla’amin approved their agreement this summer, but had to face down a court challenge to do it. Of the remaining 56 negotiations, only K’omoks First Nation has an agreement-in-principle, and there is little to suggest that any other deals are close to fruition. At 18 tables, absolutely nothing is happening. Last September, on the nineteenth anniversary of the process, Pierre openly questioned whether nearly two decades of effort and a tab of one billion dollars have been worthwhile, given the glaring lack of results. She also expressed her belief that unless significant progress was made within twelve months, the treaty process would be in grave jeopardy. She was not alone in her views. In 2011, consultant James Lornie undertook a review of the treaty process for the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development. Lornie echoed Pierre’s call for urgent action: “My view is that if little has changed [by the 20th anniversary of the process in September 2012], the process as a whole will be at serious risk of failure.” Among numerous barriers to progress Lornie identified were immensely bureaucratic and painfully slow decision-making structures within the federal government system, and inflexible federal government mandates. Lornie also emphasized the need for action to relieve the overwhelming debt burden to the government that BC First Nations have accumulated to fund their negotiations—$450 million to date and counting. But if the federal government is planning to act on the Lornie report, there’s little sign of it. “There’s been no discussion on how to use the recommendations in the report, even though the other two parties and the Commission keep raising it,” says Pierre. The offline chatter is that, like every other damning report on the process that has been produced over the last decade—and there are many—the Lornie report will be quietly shelved. “Yes, I think if they had their druthers, the federal government would prefer that this report simply gets buried like all the others and doesn’t see daylight again,” agrees Pierre sadly. The impenetrable federal bureaucracy hasn’t been the only thing getting in the way of reaching agreements. Back in 1992, First Nations were riding high on the crest of a wave of powerful court cases supporting aboriginal rights and title. But most of them were also starting from zero in pulling together their negotiating positions, let alone sorting out conflicts between themselves over shared or overlapping territorial claims, like the one that has the Yale stymied. There has also been an almost insurmountable gap in expectations as to what treaties will deliver. Among other things, First Nations want recognition of their aboriginal rights and title and full compensation for the many losses they have suffered. But governments have been reluctant to even discuss these matters, let alone agree to them. The recalibration of the provincial and federal government systems to contemplate a whole new world of sharing lands, resource revenues, and governance authorities with First Nations was also akin to turning a ship at sea: it took an inordinate amount of time to slow down and change direction to start working with First Nations rather than continue century-old habits of either ignoring them or actively working against them. That’s still a work in progress: witness the federal government’s lack of reaction to the recommendations in the Lornie report. Its aggressive support for the proposed Northern Gateway Pipeline also suggests that it has little sincere interest in reconciling Aboriginal title, at least to the lands in the pipeline’s path. The provincial government also continues to permit development activities on traditional lands despite First Nations’ opposition, forcing them into court action they can ill afford. That consumes enormous energy, and treaty negotiations are often left on the sidelines in the meantime. Another factor at play has been negative public reaction to the process. In many instances, especially in the early days, First Nations faced vitriolic public opposition to their negotiating positions, often sufficient to sway nervous politicians into backing off from potential deals. To say it’s discouraging seems an understatement. But Lornie also said that he firmly believes significant progress can still be made. “I am optimistic that if the issues are addressed,” Lornie wrote in his report, “that will restore faith in the process and the consequential acceleration of conclusion of mutually satisfactory treaty agreements.” Pierre emphatically agrees: “We must recognize the potential that’s there.” That potential is huge. Quite apart from the social and cultural benefits, it is estimated that the settlement of treaties could result in net financial benefits to BC of more than $7 billion. There is also more to show for the efforts of the last 20 years than just a handful of agreements. First Nations have benefited from two decades of research into their history, rights and title. They have also started building human resource and governance capacity and, with the help of the Treaty Commission, started working out some of their shared territory claims. Outside the process, a significant number of economic deals and land transfers have been inked with the provincial government over the last few years, helping to resolve some of the issues around development activities on traditional lands and building goodwill. Last but not least, British Columbians have become more supportive, with public opinion rising to a 75 percent approval rating for treaties in early 2012, up from 65 percent in 2001. In the meantime, however, the clock is ticking, apparently in an empty room. “Last year I asked if we can start finalizing agreements now,” says Pierre. “A year later, I’m still asking that question, and I still don’t have a firm answer.” Is the process going to fail? The costs of that scenario go beyond wasted dollars and effort; the dreams of First Nations people to see justice in their lifetimes is also at stake. Pierre is anxious, but believes the momentum can and will shift. Certainly if New Zealand’s treaty experience is anything to go by, it is too soon to give up yet. The treaty settlement process started there in 1975. As in BC, there was a very steep learning curve for everyone involved. There was also great reluctance on the part of Maori claimants to be the first to sign an agreement. What if you settled for too little? Negotiating groups were extremely distrustful of government, and nervous of setting unpopular precedents for those following in their footsteps. It took more than 20 years to get past that initial distrust and fear of compromise. The first comprehensive agreement wasn’t signed until 1997. But the number of deals snowballed rapidly afterwards, and the rate of progress has continued to accelerate as comfort levels have risen around the impact of treaties and the financial and social benefits have started to show. It isn’t unreasonable to surmise that First Nations have simply invested too much in the process to give up just yet. The alternatives aren’t necessarily attractive. The cost of turning to the courts to decide these issues is prohibitive, with no guarantee of a favourable outcome. Resorting to protest action is understandably tempting, but also unlikely to achieve any mutually satisfactory resolution of the issues at stake. New Zealand’s success hasn’t just been a product of time but of real political commitment by the government there to conclude agreements. In the absence of the same level of commitment from both the federal and provincial governments here, how long the patience of First Nations with taking one step forwards and two steps back will continue to last is anyone’s guess. Katherine Gordon is a former New Zealand land claim negotiator and Chief Treaty Negotiator for BC, and a writer based on Gabriola Island. She worked closely with Jim Lornie on producing the Lornie Report.

February 2015 The extraordinary potential of Vancouver Island forests to sequester carbon is being lost due to government inaction. (Originally published in Focus Magazine) VICKY HUSBAND, one of BC's best-known environmentalists and a member of the Order of Canada and the Order of BC, states the situation in her typical forthright fashion: “Our forests are being completely plundered. It’s a cut-and-run approach that isn’t providing local jobs, isn’t going into value-added products, and certainly isn’t seeing money coming back into the pockets of the people of BC. Forest management in BC, as it is practised today, is none of those things.” It also isn’t helping preserve the capacity of BC’s unique coastal forests, world-famous for their huge and ancient spruce, fir and cedar, to absorb greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and sequester that carbon in those giant trees. In the mid-1950s, as Husband points out, old-growth forests (more than 140 years old) once painted Vancouver Island and the south coast of BC a rich dark green. By 2014, as shown on the map below by David Leversee, green has been almost completely replaced by the purple of second-growth trees, some still in their infancy. Even second-growth forests are now at risk, as logging companies turn their eyes towards trees as young as 40 years old in the quest to meet their bottom lines. Why does it matter? The Sierra Club calculates that remaining high-quality old-growth forests on Vancouver Island and the South Coast are still currently storing at least 225 million tonnes of carbon, equivalent to more than 13 times BC’s annual greenhouse gas emissions. But that clearly can’t be taken for granted. With a business-as-usual rate of logging, those remaining old trees—along with their remarkable ability to capture and store massive amounts of carbon—could vanish in our lifetimes. With the way things are going in Canada’s efforts to reach greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, it’s a loss we can ill afford. BY NO LATER THAN the end of March, Canada is required to submit a preliminary long-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction plan to the United Nations in anticipation of the annual UN Climate Change Conference taking place in Paris in December 2015. Given the federal government’s track record to date (Canada perennially wins the Climate Action Network’s Fossil of the Year Award), it’s difficult to imagine the plan will commit to any significant transition away from fossil fuel exploitation. That’s despite the fact that by 2020, Canada’s oil and gas sector is expected to have increased its annual emissions from 2005 levels by 45 megatonnes. It’s also despite the fact that 2020 is the year by which Canada is supposed to reduce its annual emissions by 17 percent from 2005 levels of 731 megatonnes of carbon dioxide, equivalent to a target of 611 megatonnes. We already know that we’re not going to get even close. Environment Canada estimates that Canada’s annual emissions will still be as high as 727 megatonnes by 2020. In BC, emissions reduction targets are considerably more ambitious—and equally tenuous. The Province has committed to reduce its emissions to 33 percent below 2007 levels (64.3 megatonnes) by 2020, and 80 percent by 2050. In its 2014 Progress Report on Climate Action, the provincial Ministry of Environment (MoE) reported that it had achieved an interim target of 6 percent by 2012. The next interim target is a significantly higher 18 percent reduction in emissions by next year. Yet the provincial government continues to frantically promote massive high-emissions LNG development. It has also done little to stand in the way of oil infrastructure proposals (i.e. pipelines). BC’s carbon tax, though lauded by some, is viewed by many economists as too low to effectively discourage fossil fuel use. Falling oil prices aren’t helping. MoE openly admits: “More action will be needed to move from each target to the next. With current policies remaining as they are, BC greenhouse gas emissions may begin to increase.” Meanwhile, the temperature keeps going up. Climate scientists recently announced that 2014 was the hottest year on record. They said the same thing about 2013. According to the US National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, 11 of the 12 warmest years on record have occurred since 2000. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned against the drastic consequences of a global average temperature increase of two degrees Celsius. At current rates of emissions, that may well occur before the end of this century, with consequences typically described in biblical terms: extreme storms, lengthy droughts, flooding, famine, and pestilence. The IPCC also states: “Forestry can make a very significant contribution…to mitigation. In the long term, a sustainable forest management strategy aimed at maintaining or increasing forest carbon stocks…will generate the largest sustained [contribution].” GIVEN CANADA'S FAILURE TO REDUCE fossil fuel exploitation in the last decade, could forest carbon sequestration offer the solution to achieving our emissions reduction targets? Victoria-based Natural Resources Canada senior research scientist Dr Werner Kurz is unequivocal in his response: “Forests can definitely make a meaningful and significant contribution.” Global forests currently remove up to one-third of the world’s carbon emissions from the atmosphere and sequester or store them in their wood, leaves and roots and in the surrounding soil. They also emit carbon in a variety of ways, including through decay and wildfire. Forests are carbon sinks if they absorb more carbon than they emit, or carbon sources if they emit more than they absorb. How forest resources are used also affects whether forests are carbon sinks or sources. When cut timber is stored in long-lived wood products, like construction lumber and high-end value-added products, it continues to store carbon for a long time. Emissions are also reduced if those products are used in construction to replace emissions-intensive products like steel and concrete. Converting wastewood to biofuel may also reduce emissions if the biofuel replaces fossil fuel energy. Conversely, burning wood or using it for shorter-lived products like pulp and paper will result in the tree’s carbon being released to the atmosphere in the short term, thus adding to emissions totals. With 310 million hectares of forests, 55 million of them in BC, Canada has the potential to contribute significantly to global carbon sequestration. Since 2002, however, Canada’s forests—including BC’s—have been a carbon source, not a sink. The reasons include wildfires and unprecedented insect outbreaks (both of which can result from warming temperatures). However, it's the rate at which our trees are being cut down that is the biggest contributor. Environment Canada openly acknowledges in Canada’s Emissions Trends 2014: “The human activity that has the most impact on Canada’s forest emissions/removals is harvesting.” In BC’s 2010 State of the Forests report, the provincial Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations includes a graph that clearly shows that the emissions from continued harvesting in BC far exceed those from fire and slashburning, and outweigh emissions sequestered in growing trees by a factor of two to one. In its 2013 publication Growing Carbon Sinks, Ministry of Forests also admits that increased harvest rates are a problem. Despite both admissions, neither Canada nor BC has moved to limit harvesting towards reducing overall carbon emissions. WERNER KURZ BEGAN WORKING WITH the University of Victoria’s Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions in mid-2014 to research the ways in which BC’s forests can contribute to climate change mitigation. Kurz says that BC’s coastal forests are key in the carbon sequestration equation: “On Vancouver Island and the coast, trees can grow for hundreds of years. They may be taking up carbon at fairly high rates for two or three centuries. The risk of loss due to natural forces is also probably lower than elsewhere in Canada, so [this is where] we likely have the greatest opportunity to grow long-lived forests storing a lot of carbon for a long time.” The provincial government appears to agree: “Some of [BC’s] forests,” boasts its Ministry of Forests, “contain the most carbon storage per hectare of any forest type in the world.” Ministry of Forests states that a 100-year-old coastal Sitka spruce will store about 1.84 tonnes of carbon (compared to an interior spruce the same age, at 0.47 tonnes). Coastal red cedar and Douglas fir aren’t far behind their spruce cousins, storing 1.47 and 1.32 tonnes of carbon respectively by the time they hit a century (an interior Douglas fir, by comparison, stores about one-third that amount). An assumption oft-quoted by the forest industry is that the rate at which mature trees sequester carbon slows down and becomes negligible after about 100 years. It’s used as a justification to cut down relatively young trees: If they’ve become “decadent” and they’re not continuing to absorb carbon from the atmosphere, why leave them standing? But in 2008, a scientific study in the US established that forests as old as eight centuries in fact do continue to accumulate carbon, and at a significant rate. In 2014 another group of US scientists built on that finding, concluding not only that old trees continue to accumulate carbon but that the larger a tree gets, the more carbon it accumulates each year. In just one West Coast forest plot that the scientists studied, trees larger than one metre in diameter comprised just 6 percent of the trees, but accounted for 33 percent of the growth. Lead scientist Stephen Sillett concluded: “The idea that older forests are decadent—it’s really just a myth.” Kurz believes there’s no time to waste in implenting forestry-related mitigation measures aimed at meaningful long-term reductions in provincial emissions. “Ecosystems are slow-moving,” he explains. “At the rate trees grow in Canada, it could take several decades to see the full benefit of changes to forest management. We have to start making those changes now so they are having an impact by 2050, when we need our forests to be making the biggest contribution to emissions reductions.” Unfortunately, there’s little sign of anything actually happening on the ground. When Kurz was asked about the timeline for implementation of his research results, he responded candidly: “I honestly don’t know.” In the meantime, as usual, the economy continues to drive the federal government’s agenda. Canada’s Action on Climate Change “Reducing Greenhouse Gases” webpage contains no reference to forest management. Moreover, Natural Resources Canada suggests that reducing harvesting would have a negligible impact on emissions. That’s despite their own admission that “[It is clear] that where deforestation is reduced, the immediate outcome is reduced GHG emissions.” NRC also admits that the rate at which net deforestation is occurring is only expected to drop by a fraction from 2005 levels by 2020, “due to the expansion of the oil and gas industry.” NRC says that it would simply cost too much to engage in afforestation, or the creation of new forests where none exist now: “One problem identified is that many of the costs of afforestation must be paid for upfront, but the carbon sink benefits develop slowly over time. This means that afforestation is not always economically attractive to the private sector.” Heaven forbid companies profiting from resource extraction should have to pay for mitigation of the impacts of their activities. BC at least promotes forest carbon management as “an immediate imperative.” But as usual, talk is one thing, action another. In 2013’s Growing Carbon Sinks, the Ministry of Forests admits “no official strategy exists currently.” The Ministry has committed to developing a climate action plan by March 31 of this year. A request for an update on the status and likely contents of the plan received no response, however. In 2010, the provincial government did enact a net-zero-deforestation policy for BC. As Kurz points out, however, while that may mean there have been no further reductions in forest land area in BC, that doesn’t mean a net-zero impact on carbon emissions: “You’re typically cutting down mature trees but replacing them with small ones, so you likely still have a net reduction in carbon stocks.” To the Province, age doesn’t seem to matter, despite the science pointing to the carbon storage efficiency of older trees. The Ministry of Forests states: “[The] minimum harvestable age is an estimate of the earliest age at which a stand has reached a harvestable condition—i.e., has met minimum merchantable criteria.” In other words, if there’s a market for it, you can chop it down. For Douglas fir, admits the Ministry of Forests, that can be as young as 40 years. Then there’s the issue of private forest land, comprising 20 percent of Vancouver Island’s forest cover. The provincial government doesn’t regulate harvesting on private land. The Ministry of Forests confirms that: “The determination of minimum harvest age on private-managed forest land is at the discretion of the landowner.” Commons BC geographic information system mapper Dave Leversee estimates that from 2012 to 2014, of the more than 40 million cubic metres of timber logged on Vancouver Island, one-third of it came from private lands. That’s a lot of unregulated wood. Here are some more depressing statistics. Unprocessed logs, more than 40 percent of which come from private forest land, comprise more than 30 percent of coastal forest exports. Forty-six percent of the Coast-Douglas Fir Zone—southeastern Vancouver Island and the Gulf Islands—had been lost to non-forest use by 2010. Seventy-five mills have closed permanently in BC since 2000, 17 of them on Vancouver Island and another 33 on the rest of the coast. In the two decades to 2011, forest sector jobs had declined by 52 percent to just over 46,000. In other words, strategies to support the forest economy on the BC coast—let alone promote carbon sequestration or the local wood product industry—seem to be thin on the ground. There is an upside to all this, according to the Ministry of Forests: mill closures and a reduction in industrial activity in recent years “have contributed to a decrease in emissions.” THE SIERRA CLUB ADVOCATES that from a carbon storage perspective, logging of old-growth forests needs to stop today. Their 2013 report Carbon at Risk: BC’s Unprotected Old-growth Rainforest, concluded, “Avoided logging of old-growth rainforest is one of the most immediately effective actions to reduce emissions.” It argued that from a carbon perspective, “converting old-growth rainforest to second growth is like giving away a safe, hefty bank account with a decent interest rate in exchange for a start-up bank account with almost zero money and the promise of spectacular growth based on unreliable forecasts.” Vicky Husband believes that given how little old-growth remains, it is now just as necessary to provide similar protection to mature second-growth forests: “It’s absolutely critical,” she declares emphatically, “to preserve all these big trees.” Given how important a role BC’s coastal forest could play in terms of carbon emissions reductions, preserving mature trees—on both Crown and private land—would seem logical as a simple matter of precaution. Katherine Palmer Gordon has written six books of non-fiction, including several BC Bestsellers and a Haig-Brown prize-winner. Her most recent book is We Are Born with the Songs Inside Us: Lives and Stories of First Nations People in British Columbia.